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Abstract  
In this paper we revisit the often disregarded ‘pocketbook voting’ thesis that suggests that 
people evaluate governments based on the state of their own finances. Using data from the 
British Household Panel Survey over the last 20 years, we measure changes in personal 
financial circumstances and show that the ‘pocketbook voting’ model works. Crucially, we 
also argue that the ability to attribute responsibility for these changes to the government 
matters. People respond much more strongly to changes in their own finances that are linked 
to government spending, such as welfare transfers, than to similar changes that are less 
clearly the responsibility of elected officials, such as lower personal earnings. We conclude 
that pocketbook voting is a real phenomenon, but that more attention should be paid to how 
people assign credit and blame for changes in their own economic circumstances.  
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In order to ascertain whether the incumbents have performed poorly or well, citizens need 
only calculate the changes in their own welfare. 
(Fiorina 1981, 5) 
 
Do voters’ assessments of their changing financial circumstances shape their party support? 
The above quotation suggests that retrospective economic voting is fairly straightforward. If 
people think that they are personally worse off they should ‘throw the rascals out’, but if they 
feel better off they should re-elect the incumbent. This is referred to as ‘pocketbook voting’, 
where voters choose to punish or reward governments on the basis of changes in their 
personal economic circumstances. While the idea of pocketbook voting continues to 
dominate political discourse, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence to support it and 
the possible reasons that underlie this type of voting remain opaque. The consensus in the 
economic voting literature has long been that while voters do base their party support on 
retrospective economic evaluations, it is primarily their assessment of the nation’s economic 
condition that matters, so-called sociotropic voting (see Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; 
Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 2007, 2013).  
 
Yet, recent work has suggested that changes in individual financial circumstances can affect 
voting behavior in certain contexts. This evidence, based mainly on quasi-experimental 
methods, demonstrates that voters respond to specific government policies that affect their 
livelihoods and bank accounts, such as job training programs, childcare benefits, disaster 
relief efforts and other forms of targeted government policies, and adjust their political 
preferences accordingly (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011; Elinder et al 2015; Healy and 
Malhotra 2010; Levitt and Snyder 1997; Margalit 2011; Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012; 
Richter 2006; Shady 2000; Zucco Jr 2013). While it is compelling that economic self-interest 
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can matter to voters in some specific cases, this work does not provide a comprehensive test 
of the classic retrospective pocketbook model of voting. In this paper, we contribute to the 
study of economic voting by not only presenting an empirical reassessment of the pocketbook 
voting thesis using panel survey data, but also examining the underlying mechanisms of such 
voting. We argue that pocketbook voting is linked to how citizens attribute responsibility for 
changes in their personal economic circumstances. Instead of assuming that voters hold the 
government equally responsible for all changes to their financial situation, we argue that 
changes that can be directly linked to government policies have a greater effect on support for 
the incumbent.  
 
To rigorously test these propositions, we analyze data from the British Household Panel 
Survey. These data are particularly well-suited to test the pocketbook voting and attribution 
theses. By using repeated observations of the same people over a long time span which 
includes different incumbent governments, we aim to minimize difficulties associated with 
causal inference and endogeneity: the problem of whether vote choices cause economic 
perceptions rather than vice versa (Evans and Andersen 2006; Evans and Pickup 2010; Fraile 
and Lewis-Beck 2014; Lewis-Beck et al 2008; Tilley et al 2008). Our analysis demonstrates 
that voters’ evaluations of changes in their personal finances do shift party support. When 
people think that they are personally worse off, they are less likely to support the governing 
party, and when they are personally better off, they are more likely to support the governing 
party. These results hold under a number of different model specifications, including cross-
lagged models of perceptions and party support. Crucially, we also show that these effects 
depend on why people think their material conditions have changed. Changes that might be 
difficult to attribute to the government have a weaker effect than those that are easier to pin 
on the government. In particular, government welfare transfers increasing or decreasing make 
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a substantial difference to party choice, whereas changes to earnings are much less 
consequential. These findings have important implications for economic voting, and more 
broadly for our understanding of how voters hold governments to account. We suggest that 
voters take notice of government policies that affect them directly and sanction incumbents 
accordingly. 
 
Pocketbook voting and attribution of responsibility 
The early economic voting literature focused on macro-economic change and how good 
economic performance strengthened support for incumbent parties. Most studies used 
aggregate data, including a variety of different ways of measuring ‘good’ economic 
performance including high growth, low unemployment or low inflation (see Kramer 1971; 
Tufte 1978; Mueller 1970). However, because of the country-level nature of these studies, it 
was difficult to disentangle the individual level reward-punishment mechanism of the model. 
In recent decades, most people have therefore used survey data with people’s views of 
economic change as an indicator of macro-economic performance (see Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2000, 2007 for overviews). A key question in this literature is whether economic 
voting is driven by personal experiences. Are voters motivated to change their party 
preferences by changes to their ‘pocketbook’?  Despite the widespread assumption that voters 
evaluate incumbents, at least in part, on the basis of how government policies have affected 
their personal economic fortunes, it is not clear that pocketbook considerations matter. While 
some studies do find evidence of pocketbook voting (Nannestad and Paldam 1994, 1997; 
Alvarez and Saving 1997; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006), most find zero or modest effects 
(Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Feldman 1982; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Soss and 
Schram 2007). In their excellent reviews of a large number of published studies on economic 
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voting, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007, 2013) conclude that the empirical support for the 
pocketbook voting model is marginal at best.  
 
This conclusion is in many ways surprising. While it is very persuasive that sociotropic 
evaluations are a crucial factor shaping vote choice, there are equally compelling reasons why 
pocketbook considerations might also matter.
 
Much of the theoretical literature on strategic 
politicians assumes that incumbents can bolster their re-election chances by securing 
additional resources for their constituents and targeting public spending (Tufte 1978; Dixit 
and Londegan 1996). There is also plenty of evidence to suggest that politicians use public 
budgets to try and keep constituents happy (Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; 
Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Levitt and Snyder 1997), implying that politicians certainly 
believe that citizens vote with their pocketbooks (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002). This model 
of strategic politicians using public spending to win votes rests on the assumption that voters 
also behave in a self-interested manner: that voters reward incumbent politicians when they 
benefit from public transfers and punish them when public spending cuts affect them. In other 
words, vote choices are shaped not just by perceptions of the national economy, but also by 
people’s perceptions of their own personal economic situation.  
 
Some studies have shown effects of pocketbook considerations in the very specific case of 
US Congressional elections (Alvarez and Saving 1997; Levitt and Snyder 1997, 
Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006). Another strand of more recent research has also identified 
substantial effects of specific changes in policy on the behavior and attitudes of those people 
affected. Rather than analyzing responses to survey questions on changes in personal 
financial circumstances, most of this work uses quasi-experimental designs to investigate 
how actual policy change has influenced party preferences. Examples of where such policy 
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effects have been found include the Vietnam Draft Lottery in the US (Erikson and Stoker 
2011), flood responses in Germany (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011), investment in urban 
public transport in Spain (de la Calle and Orriols 2010), non-payment of wages in Russia 
(Richter 2006), targeted government spending to poor families in Romania (Pop-Eleches and 
Pop-Eleches 2012), conditional cash transfers in Brazil (Zucco Jr 2013), and budget cuts 
affecting parents with young children in Sweden (Elinder et al 2015).  
 
Taken together, this more recent work suggests that voters do respond in a self-interested 
manner to specific policy changes that affect their financial circumstances, and this calls for a 
more general re-examination of the pocketbook voting model. The aim of this paper is thus to 
return to this model by examining whether perceptions of change in personal financial 
circumstances shape support for the incumbent, using high quality panel survey data in a 
more typical party-based parliamentary system. We focus on perceptions, as pocketbook 
voting is about people’s subjective views of improvement, or deterioration, to their personal 
finances and the impact those perceptions on vote choice. Specifically, we hypothesize that if 
people think that their own financial conditions have improved, they will reward the 
incumbent governing party. In contrast when people think that their own finances have 
deteriorated, they will be more likely to support the opposition. This leads to a restatement of 
the pocketbook voting hypothesis as below: 
 
H1: People who think that their personal finances have improved are more likely to support 
the incumbent party than people who think their personal financial situation has deteriorated. 
 
We go one step further than simply testing the classic pocketbook voting thesis to also 
examine the mechanisms that lead voters to punish or reward governments for changes in 
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their personal economic circumstances. Importantly, we do not argue that all changes in 
personal finances are a useful heuristic for ascertaining how well the incumbent has 
performed, as Fiorina (1981) suggests in the opening quotation of this paper. Rather, we 
amend the basic model of pocketbook voting in one crucial way: we take into account the 
reason why people think their finances have changed. We argue that changes that are within 
the government’s remit will be more important in deciding vote choices. It is less a case of 
macro-economic change driving party preferences via personal finances, but rather 
government policies shaping those party preferences via personal finances. The intermediary 
in both cases is the voter’s personal financial situation, but the way in which governments 
shape those situations is quite different. 
 
We argue that attribution of responsibility is thus a moderator of pocketbook voting. The 
importance of responsibility is already well-established in studies of sociotropic economic 
voting. In their seminal article, Powell and Whitten (1993) show that economic voting is 
conditioned by the ‘clarity of responsibility’ of political institutions. More specifically, they 
argue that complex institutional and governmental structures blur lines of responsibility and 
this blurring makes it more difficult for voters to assign responsibility and therefore sanction 
governments on the basis of their performance. In subsequent work, scholars have extended 
the original Powell and Whitten index and have moved towards a more dynamic 
understanding of how clarity of responsibility matters (Whitten and Palmer 1999; Anderson 
2000; Nadeau et al 2002; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Hobolt et al 2013). The basic finding 
remains the same: if voters cannot say that the government is responsible for the outcome, 
they also cannot punish it for poor outcomes. However, while it is well-established that 
attribution of responsibility is a key factor in sociotropic economic voting, this has been 
largely overlooked when it comes to people’s personal finances. 
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Existing studies of pocketbook voting often rely on the (usually tacit) assumption that voters 
attribute all changes in their financial situation to the policies of the government (Kinder and 
Kiewiet 1979; Markus 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001). Equally for work that shows 
that voters adjust political preferences in response to specific policy events, such as disaster 
relief or a military draft, attribution of causal responsibility is fairly straightforward. 
Attributing responsibility for changes in household incomes is far from straightforward 
however. Incumbent governments have little control over people’s day to day finances and 
citizens are likely to be aware of this (Gomez and Wilson 2001; Hellwig 2001; Marsh and 
Tilley 2010; Rudolph 2003; Tilley and Hobolt 2011; Hobolt and Tilley 2014). Moreover 
there are differences in the causes of changing personal incomes that will lead individuals to 
assign more or less responsibility to the government. Put simply, some changes are more 
directly linked to government policies than others. This seems to be most likely to be the case 
when it comes to increases or decreases in welfare transfers. After all these are payments 
from government agencies to individuals. We therefore hypothesize that voters will be more 
likely to support the government if they receive an increase in government transfers than if 
they earn more money because of a new job or promotion. In the former situation, voters may 
well link their increased spending power to actions of the government. In the latter situation, 
voters will, no doubt, see this as a result of their own hard work, ability or good fortune. Our 
second hypothesis is thus: 
 
H2: The effect of changing personal finances on incumbent party support is greater when the 
causes of these changes can be more directly attributed to changes in government spending.  
 
Methods and data 
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To test these hypotheses, we use the unique and under-explored British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS). This ran from 1991 until 2008
1
 and therefore encompasses a period of 
Conservative government (1991-1997) and a period of Labour government (1997-2008). The 
BHPS is an annual face-to-face panel survey of a representative sample of the British 
population with a questionnaire that is mainly focused on changes in household composition, 
labor market participation and other economic and sociological factors. Our dependent 
variable is party support. This is measured using three questions. The first asks whether 
respondents think of themselves as a ‘supporter of any one political party’, if they say no then 
they are asked whether they think of themselves as ‘a little closer to one political party than 
to the others’, and if they say no to that they are finally asked ‘if there were to be a General 
Election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support’.2 
In essence, this is a measure of vote in years when there are no elections. It is widely used to 
measure vote intention in the British case (Evans and Tilley 2012; Tilley 2015) and is highly 
correlated with vote choice in election years. For example, in 1997 we have people’s recalled 
vote in May and our measure of party support in the autumn. 92 per cent of people that voted 
Conservative in May 1997 said that they supported the Conservatives a few months later, the 
same comparison for Labour is 91 per cent and the Liberal Democrats 86 per cent. Given that 
the British electoral system generates some tactical voting, with slightly under 10 per cent of 
people voting tactically over the 1990s and 2000s (Fisher 2004; Fisher and Curtice 2006), 
                                                     
1
 After the 2008 wave the BHPS was discontinued although many of the participants formed part of a new 
‘Understanding Society’ longitudinal survey. For more information on the BHPS (including the exact sampling 
strategy and level of panel attrition) see https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps.    
2
 For the 1992 wave, people were not asked a vote intention, but rather how they voted in the 1992 election. For 
people that did not answer the ‘supporter’ and ‘closer’ questions we used vote choice in 1992 to calculate party 
support.  
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this suggests that our measure of party support is essentially a measure of vote choice/ 
intention free of these tactical concerns.  
 
In our analysis, we exclude Northern Ireland, which has a very different party system, as well 
as any respondents under 18 who are not eligible to vote in general elections. This leaves us 
with a sample of 9,354 people during the Conservative government (1991-1996 waves) and 
17,183 respondents during the Labour government (1997-2008 waves). About 40 per cent of 
the people in the repeated sample are ‘supporters’ of a party, another 22 per cent are closer to 
a party and a further 15 per cent give a vote intention. Of our total repeated sample between 
1991 and 2008, 23 per cent are Conservatives, 36 per cent Labour, 12 per cent Liberal 
Democrats, 7 per cent support other smaller parties and 23 per cent do not support a party. 
This distribution only changes slightly over time.
3
  
 
Our two main independent variables are measures of changing personal financial 
circumstances. The first of these is a widely used question about perceptions of change over 
the last year (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 2007). It is thus analogous to the standard 
sociotropic measure that asks about perceptions of how the general economic situation 
changed over the last year. As discussed earlier, by measuring perceptions of change we are 
measuring the most proximate factor to party choice. The exact wording of the perceptions 
question is: ‘Would you say that you yourself are better off or worse off financially than you 
were a year ago?’ Better off, worse off, about the same.’ 48 per cent of our total repeated 
sample reports no change in income, 27 per cent an increase and 24 per cent a decrease.  
 
                                                     
3
 For the 1991-1996 period when the Conservatives were in government, Labour partisans make up 38 per cent 
of the panel, and this is only slightly lower at 35 per cent during the 1997-2008 period when Labour is in power.       
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Crucially, for anyone that said that they were better or worse off, this is followed by an open 
ended question that asks simply ‘why is that?’. The responses to this have been coded up into 
eight categories: increased earnings, increased government transfers, reduced expenses, other 
increases in income, decreased earnings, decreased government transfers, increased expenses, 
other decreases in income.
4
 We divide it up in this way because most people’s income is 
labor income or government transfer income. It is worth noting that in the UK, as in most 
other European welfare states, government cash payments are not simply targeted at the poor. 
A substantial proportion of the population receives some form of transfer from the 
government. For example, almost every family with children receives child benefit, for a 
family with two children this is almost £2,000 a year, and almost everyone over the age of 65 
receives a state pension of at least £6,000 a year. On average between 1991 and 2008, 56 per 
cent of BHPS households received some form of cash benefit paid directly by the state.  
 
Modeling pocketbook voting 
Our goal is to test whether a respondent’s own financial experiences inform their party 
choice. For that, we rely on the structure of our data. The BHPS is a panel survey and 
interviews the same people year after year. We are thus able to model the dynamics of party 
support given changes in personal finances. There are three parts to this. First, we need to 
                                                     
4
 This represents a slightly reduced categorization from the original coding by the BHPS (the verbatim answers 
are not available). The main changes are twofold. First, we roll some of the smaller categories (investment 
income changes, one off windfalls or expenditure and ‘good management’) into the ‘other’ increases or 
decreases in income. Second, some people mentioned both positive and negative changes to their financial 
situation. For example, some people said that they were earning more, but they also faced more expenses. We 
have coded these people (less than 2 per cent of people that said their financial circumstances had changed) by 
the dominant change, so the person who is earning more but faces more expenditure and said that they were 
better off overall is counted as someone who has had a change due to increased earnings.  
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account for serial correlation, as people’s successive measures of party support are dependent 
on their previous party support. Second, we need to include changes in someone’s financial 
situation in predicting party support. Finally, we need to take into account that when people 
enter the panel they differ in how likely they are to support a particular party (this relates to 
unit heterogeneity). We meet these three requirements by using a first-order Markov 
transitioning structure, where someone’s party preference at time t is a function of their party 
preference at time t-1. Two recent articles by Clarke and McCutcheon (2009) and Neundorf 
et al (2011) demonstrate that Markov models are particularly good at specifying the dynamics 
of individual-level party support. As we have only a few waves of data and a categorical 
dependent variable, Markov models are preferable to a fixed effects (FE) model. The problem 
of modeling a categorical dependent variable (party support) with a FE model is that ‘the FE 
estimator shows a large positive finite sample bias in discrete choice models when t is very 
small’ (Greene 2004: 144). Equally ‘dynamic models of preferences should include a 
persistence parameter capturing this correlation’ (Stegmueller 2013: 316). FE logistic models 
cannot account for this state dependence in the data, as standard FE estimation strategies are 
unavailable due to the presence of a lagged dependent (endogenous) variable in the nonlinear 
model (Nickell 1981; Heckman 1981; Arellano and Carrasco 2003). We nonetheless present 
the results of fixed effect models in Table 5 of the robustness section and the results are 
consistent with our findings.  
 
In terms of specification, if i indexes individuals (i =1,...,I) observed in BHPS survey wave t 
(t =1,...,T), then a Markov model is specified as:
5
 
 
                                                     
5
 The models were estimated using the LatentGOLD 5.1 (Vermunt and Magidson 2013).  
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log (
𝑃(𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟| 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠)
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠 | 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠
) =  𝛽0𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 
(1) 
 
Model (1) specifies the categorical level variable measuring party support PSt, to be a 
function of the previously held party loyalty PSt−1. The model’s transition dynamics are 
parametrized by a series of logit equations modeling the probability of supporting party r 
instead of party s as a function of the overall intercepts and the lagged party support effects 
that are captured by 𝛽1𝑟𝑠𝑡 . The advantage of this model over other techniques is the use of a 
categorical dependent variable. The model’s transition dynamics are parametrized by a time-
heterogeneous Markov transition structure, allowing transition probabilities in and out of 
party support to differ between surveys. This captures overall time effects such as the 
changing nature of party fortunes due to leadership changes, political scandals and so forth.  
 
Once we have determined the dynamics of individuals’ party support we can introduce the 
covariate xit that measures changes in a respondent’s personal finances. Model 2 introduces 
the coefficients 𝛽2𝑟𝑠  that measure the impact of people’s subjective finances on the 
probability of someone updating their support for any of the parties at time t:
6
 
 
log (
𝑃(𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟| 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠)
𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠 | 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑠
) =  𝛽0𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑠 𝑥𝑖𝑡  
(2) 
 
The model above models the dynamics of party support and how changes in a respondent’s 
finances affect this dynamic. People clearly differ in their probability to support one or 
another party (or none at all) in the first place. It is therefore important to account for 
                                                     
6
 For this to be effective, we need people to be in multiple waves of the data. This means that we have excluded 
respondents that only answered questions in one or two waves. A minimum of three responses, gives us at least 
two transitions per person. For the 1991-1997 period, this excludes about 10 per cent of respondents, and for the 
1998-2008 period about 5 per cent of respondents. 
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variables that predict party support, and model 3 controls for a range of social characteristics 
(K) at the point at which people first entered the panel (t=0):  
 
log (
𝑃(𝑃𝑆𝑖0 = 𝑟| 𝑃𝑆𝑖0 = 𝑠)
𝑃𝑆𝑖0 = 𝑠 | 𝑃𝑆𝑖0 = 𝑠
) =  𝛼0𝑟𝑠 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘 𝑤𝑖0𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
 
(3) 
 
These variables are well-known demographic predictors of party support in the British 
context: occupational social class, age, employment status, region, income, sector of 
employment, education, housing tenure and gender.
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Results 
Do changes in people’s household finances affect their support for governing and opposition 
parties? To answer this question we divide the panel into two periods: the 1991-1996 period 
when the Conservatives are in government and Labour, along with all other parties, is in 
opposition; and the 1997-2008 period during which Labour is in government and the 
Conservatives, and all other parties, are in opposition.
8
  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 reports the main effects of personal finances on the transition probabilities of 
changing party support over these two periods expressed in Model 2. Specifically we show 
                                                     
7
 The coefficients for these control variables are reported in Appendix 2. The impact of the control variables is 
much as we would expect. Older, richer people in private sector middle class occupations who own their own 
house are more likely to support the Conservatives, and the opposite for Labour supporters. The inclusion of 
these variables makes little difference to the key results concerning economic perceptions. 
8
 As the BHPS fieldwork is carried out in the autumn and the 1997 general election was held on the 1
st
 of May, 
we use the 1997 data to provide a starting point for people in the second period. 
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the coefficients predicting the transition probability of someone updating their party support 
between time t-1 and t, depending on whether their subjective financial situation got better, 
got worse or stayed the same. We use effect coding rather than dummy coding, which allows 
us to compare the effect of all three options rather than using one as a reference category. 
Table 1 thus shows how likely it is that someone will switch towards, or away from, each of 
the parties given their reports of how their finances have changed over the last year. A 
positive number means that people switch towards that party, a negative number that they 
switch away. Turning to the Conservative government period first in Table 1, what we see is 
that the pound in people’s pocket does matter. Positive changes in household finances lead to 
positive switches towards the incumbent governing party, and switches away from the main 
opposition party Labour. Negative changes to household finances lead to people switching 
away from the Conservatives and towards Labour. There is a similar pattern for the period of 
Labour government. When people feel better off they switch away from the Conservatives 
and towards Labour, when people feel worse off people switch towards the Conservatives 
and away from the Labour government. No matter the color of the government, when 
individuals’ household finances improve they reward the governing party and punish the 
opposition, when their household finances deteriorate they punish the governing party and 
reward the opposition. These findings provide support for our first hypothesis. 
 
These are important results, as they clearly show that individuals’ party choices are affected 
by their changing personal financial circumstances. These effects hold for government and 
opposition parties and are apparent during periods of different party rule. To illustrate the 
magnitude of these pocketbook considerations, Table 2 shows how the predicted probabilities 
of support for the Conservatives and Labour would change for people with different party 
choices and facing different financial circumstances. For the period of Conservative party 
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rule, individuals who previously supported the Conservatives are more likely to defect if they 
see their household finances deteriorating than people who see things improving: 80 per cent 
of the former group remain loyal to the Conservatives compared to 83 per cent of the latter 
group who felt better off. Equally people who supported other parties are more likely to start 
supporting the Conservatives if they think things are getting better compared to those who 
think things are getting worse. For example, in any year during Conservative incumbency, 13 
per cent of people with no party support in the previous wave with a worsening financial 
situation became Conservative supporters compared to 15 per cent of people with an 
improved financial situation who previously did not support a party. The opposite pattern 
holds under the Labour governments. Previous Conservative supporters are more likely to 
stick with the party when they think things are getting worse, and similarly the Conservatives 
are more likely to pick up supporters who think their financial situation has worsened. The 
right panel of Table 2 tells the same story for Labour support. Labour supporters were more 
loyal and people were more likely to switch to Labour when their finances got worse under 
the Conservatives or got better under Labour.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
At first glance, these effects may appear small. The differences between people who felt 
worse and better off are a few percentage points at most. But this is not surprising. Aggregate 
party support changes little from year to year, just as most people do not change their party 
support from one year to another. Appendix 1 shows the high stability of party support. Any 
differences due to changing financial circumstances appear small when measured from one 
year to the next because very few people, around 20 per cent, switch party from one year to 
the next. What matters is how those small differences mount up and how they potentially 
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explain changes in the electoral strength of parties. Given how few people switch, 
pocketbook considerations are clearly a non-trivial predictor of movements between parties.  
 
Hence, contrary to much of the extant literature, our findings lend some support to the 
pocketbook voting thesis: people do change their party preferences based on their own 
financial circumstances. The question remains of the mechanism that leads voters to switch 
parties due to changes in personal finances. Our argument is that attribution of responsibility 
is a crucial part of the sanctioning process. Voters distinguish between changes that are 
outside the government’s control and changes that the government could plausibly be 
responsible for, and primarily switch party support on the basis of the latter (Hypothesis 2). 
We test this proposition by examining the reasons that people give for the improvement or 
worsening of their finances. Table 3 shows a similar model to the ones previously discussed 
except we break down changing financial circumstances by the reasons that people gave for 
that change. Again the coefficients here represent the effects of different kinds of financial 
changes on the predicted probability of someone updating their party support.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
We observe the same patterns in terms of broadly negative coefficients associated with the 
governing party when people thought things had got worse and positive coefficients when 
people thought things had got better. In line with our expectations there is also clear variation 
in the size of those coefficients dependent on why people thought things had got worse or 
better. During the period of Conservative rule in the 1990s the biggest negative effect by far 
on Conservative support is for people who thought that their finances worsened due to 
decreased welfare payments and the biggest positive effect is for people who thought that 
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their finances improved due to increased welfare payments. Other changes also mattered, 
earning more or less money affected people’s support for the Conservatives as well, but it is 
benefit changes that matter the most.  
 
There is a similar story for the Labour period of government. Labour gets more support from 
people whose government transfers increased and less support from those with reduced 
payments. The former is by far the biggest positive effect on Labour support and the latter is 
the second biggest negative effect. These results strongly suggest that pocketbook voting is 
linked to attribution of government responsibility. Changes in earnings and expenses are, for 
most people, far removed from government activities, whereas welfare transfers are paid by 
the government. Compare the myriad of reasons why you might earn more money this year 
than last year with the reality of receiving more or less money paid directly into your bank 
account by a government agency. The latter is something that can be very easily blamed on, 
or credited to, the governing party. There are other differences by people’s cited reason for 
change that we could give post hoc explanations for. Changes in earnings seem to matter for 
the Conservatives when they are in government during an economic recession, but not for 
Labour when they are in government during an economic boom. But disentangling whether 
this is due to the party in charge, or the economic conditions of the day is not possible. Indeed 
the variation in how different changes matter only highlights the much larger and more 
consistent effect of government transfer changes compared to everything else.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 shows our predictions of how benefit changes affect government support for people 
who already support the governing party. In effect, this is the degree of loyalty that people 
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have to the governing party if they already support it. For the 1991-1996 period, we would 
predict that 73 per cent of people that supported the Conservatives last year and saw their 
transfers decrease would support the Conservatives this year. For similar people who saw 
their transfers increase over 84 per cent would support the Conservatives. Exactly the same 
pattern can be seen for Labour after 1997. People are substantially more loyal to governing 
parties, regardless of their ideological stance, if they think that they are better off due to 
higher transfers than if they think they are worse off due to lower transfers. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Equally, defection rates to governing parties are much greater when people see their welfare 
benefits increase than when they see their welfare benefits decrease. Figure 2 shows how 
these defection rates vary. Defecting to the incumbent party is of course dependent on 
previous party support and general changes towards the governing party. There are few direct 
movements between Labour and the Conservatives for either period, but quite substantial 
amounts of defection to the governing party from people who supported no party and to a 
lesser extent the Liberal Democrats. More importantly we see the large differences between 
people who said their transfers increased compared to those whose transfers decreased. Fewer 
people moved to the governing party (whether Labour or Conservative) if they were worse 
off due to changes to their transfers than did people who were better off. Overall the rates of 
defection to incumbent parties for gainers from government transfer changes are almost 
double those for losers of transfer changes. 
 
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the question of whether the inclusion of changes in 
perceptions of personal finances produces a better fitting model of party support change. 
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Table 4 reports the Log-Likelihood ratio test for Model 1 (personal financial change included 
as in Table 1) and Model 2 (reason for financial change included as in Table 2) to Model 0 
(which only includes lagged party support and control variables at t=0), and the answer to 
that question is yes. Including changes in financial circumstances, as well as the more 
nuanced measure of reasons for those changes, significantly improves model fit.  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Robustness checks 
In this section, we test the robustness of our main finding to address possible concerns about 
a) the endogeneity and causal structure; b) the use of alternative estimation techniques; c) the 
inclusion of macro-economic evaluations; d) the conditional effects of political interest; e) the 
operationalization of the dependent variable; and f) the use of party support rather than vote.  
  
Endogeneity and causal structure 
One obvious issue with our results is the possible endogeneity of personal finance 
evaluations, which might themselves be driven by party support. We have attempted to test 
for this possibility by estimating cross-lagged models, in which we simultaneously model the 
dynamics of party support and subjective financial evaluations (Evans and Andersen 2006; 
Evans and Pickup 2010; Dancey and Goren 2010; Milazzo et al 2012). The results are 
reported in Appendix 4. Cross-lagged models estimate the effect of previous party support on 
reported financial change and vice versa. In summary, we find that personal financial 
evaluations are partly a product of previous party support: individuals who support the 
opposition party are more likely to feel they are worse off. Overall, the cross-lagged effects 
of party support on personal financial situations are relatively small however, and the effects 
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of lagged personal finances on party support remain largely consistent. Accounting as best we 
can for possible endogeneity, the pocketbook voting hypothesis appears to hold.    
 
Estimation 
As outlined in the earlier discussion, using fixed effect models is not ideal since we have a 
categorical dependent variable and data with many cases, but few waves. Nonetheless, we 
also ran standard fixed effects models that predict support for the incumbent party versus any 
other party, or no party, for our two government periods. These models are shown in table 5 
below. Despite using a more conservative estimation procedure, the results confirm the 
general pocketbook voting hypothesis. Changes in benefits also push people towards or away 
from the governing party, although we should note that in the period of the Conservative 
government the coefficients, while large in magnitude, are not statistically significant.  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Macro-economic evaluation and pocketbook voting  
Unfortunately, our survey data do not include the standard item used to measure ‘sociotropic’ 
economic voting, which has been shown in the literature to be more important than 
pocketbook considerations (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). As a consequence, we are not 
able to compare the strength of sociotropic and pocketbook considerations. However, we can 
show that pocketbook considerations matter when controlling for some types of national 
economic perceptions. The 1992, 1994 and 1996 surveys include two items that asked 
whether respondents were concerned about rates of inflation and unemployment in Britain. 
We added these two items alongside people’s retrospective financial evaluations. As 
expected, those concerned with unemployment and inflation tend to punish the government 
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and defect from the Conservatives. These effects have a similar magnitude to the effect of 
changing welfare transfers. Most importantly for this paper, the effects of pocketbook voting 
remain statistically significant and in the same direction even when including these 
sociotropic economic indicators. Comparing the fit of the different nested models shows that 
including personal financial changes significantly improves the model even if we take into 
account national economic evaluations. These results are reported in Appendix 5. 
 
Conditional effects of political interest 
Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2006; although see Godbout and Belanger 2007 and Gomez and 
Wilson’s (2007) reply) acknowledge the problem of diffuse attribution of responsibility in 
traditional tests of pocketbook voting and focus on how political sophistication is a key 
moderating factor in how citizens relate changes to their welfare to vote choices. In their 
theory of heterogeneous attribution, Gomez and Wilson argue that politically unsophisticated 
individuals will tend to focus on single, obvious causes for events or conditions, e.g. the 
president or indeed themselves. As reported in Appendix 6, we find only weak support for 
this idea. Although politically uninterested people (our best measure of political 
sophistication is political interest) have slightly weaker patterns of economic voting than the 
politically interested on average, we find no consistent pattern to egocentric economic voting 
by political interest, at least in Britain over the time period covered by the BHPS.  
 
Operationalization of party support  
 
We also tested whether an alternative measure of party support makes a difference to our 
results. In the main tables, party support is measured using three questions. The first asks 
whether respondents think of themselves as a ‘supporter of any one political party’, if they 
say no then they are asked whether they think of themselves as ‘a little closer to one political 
24 
 
party than to the others’, and if they say no to that they are finally asked ‘if there were to be a 
General Election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to 
support’. In our alternative operationalization, we just use the first two questions and count 
people who were unwilling to say that they ‘supported’ or ‘were closer’ to a party as 
supporters of no party. This measure should mean that party supporters have a stronger bond 
to their preferred party. Using this more conservative measure does not alter our results; 
pocketbook voting appears to be just as strong. These results are in Appendix 7. 
 
Using vote choice instead of party support as the dependent variable 
Many studies of economic voting use vote choice as their dependent variable. As discussed, 
this is not possible for data that track people’s preferences from year to year. We were able to 
re-run our models using vote choice for the Labour governing period, which covers three 
general elections: 1997, 2001 and 2005. Appendix 8 reports the results of this analysis. The 
results largely confirm our main results in that people who were better off are less likely to 
vote for the Conservatives and those that were worse off tend to stop voting for Labour and 
instead become Conservative voters. Equally people who saw their benefits increase are more 
likely to vote Labour over those three elections.  
 
Conclusion     
The empirical puzzle addressed in this paper is that while there is a widespread belief that 
governments can increase their electoral support through targeted public spending, there is far 
less evidence to show that party support is shaped by personal financial circumstances. 
Although there are numerous studies that show that citizens take into account changes in the 
national economy more broadly, the evidence that economic voting is rooted in personal 
experience is far more mixed. Nonetheless recent work examining specific government 
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policies suggests that voters who are materially affected by such policies do change their 
party support accordingly (Elinder et al 2015; Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012; Richter 
2006; Shady 2000). Building on such findings, this paper has presented a more general 
reassessment of the classic pocketbook voting thesis, using panel survey data that captures 
how perceptions of changing personal finances feed into changes in party support. In contrast 
to much of the existing work using survey data to examine economic voting, we find 
pocketbook voting: people are more likely to switch party preference when they think that 
their own personal finances have changed.  
 
This is important as it sheds light on what drives changing patterns of party support and also 
lends credence to the assumptions underlying much of the work on strategic politicians 
(Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Levitt and Snyder 
1997). It suggests that voters do act in a self-interested manner and respond to changes in 
their personal finances by sanctioning governments. However, the overall impact of 
pocketbook voting on election outcomes should not be exaggerated. The effects are not huge. 
Moreover, during stable economic times it is relatively rare that there are substantially more 
people thinking they are worse off than better off, or vice versa. The biggest differences in 
our dataset are found in 2001 and 2008. In 2001, at the height of the economic boom, 31 per 
cent of people said that they had improving personal finances compared to 20 per cent with 
deteriorating finances. In 2008, as the boom turned to bust, these percentages were reversed 
with 36 per cent of people thinking things had got worse for them and 20 per cent saying 
things had got better. Perceptions of people’s own financial situation do track the wider 
economy, but not that closely. This means that while people in a worse financial position are 
less likely to stay loyal to the government party and more likely to move to the opposition 
party, much of that depressive effect on the government vote will be cancelled out by people 
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in a better financial position staying loyal, or moving, to the government. This means that 
although personal finances may help to explain how individuals change their party 
preferences, they are inevitably less good at explaining aggregate changes in party support. 
 
Importantly, our paper goes beyond the classic pocketbook model to explore when and why 
voters sanction governments for changes to their personal finances. As our second hypothesis 
surmised, personal finances appear to have a greater impact when they can be more easily 
linked to the actions of the state. Just as perceptions of the wider economy matter more when 
it is clear that the government was responsible for changes to the general economic situation, 
changes to an individual’s economic situation matter more when they appear more closely 
linked to government action. This means that much of the change that we see in party 
preferences cannot really be accounted for by higher growth rates leading to higher wages, or 
deflation leading to reduced expenses. Rather we find the most important driver of personal 
economic performance voting is actually change that can be attributed directly to government 
policies, such as welfare payments and other government transfers. These findings are thus 
aligned with the recent literature on how voters respond to specific government policies that 
affect their material self-interest, such as flood relief (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011), 
targeted government transfers to poor families (Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012) or 
childcare payments (Elinder et al 2015). 
 
We therefore help to explain when personal financial self-interest matters. Voters do not 
appear to ask themselves the simple question of whether they are better off than they were 
last year when forming their party preferences. Instead they may switch party allegiance if 
they think that any changes to their financial circumstances are directly due to the 
government. These findings help explain why previous studies have found mixed evidence of 
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pocketbook voting. They also have broader normative implications for our understanding of 
how voters hold government to account. It is well-established that voters sanction 
governments on the basis of their perceptions of general economic performance, but our 
findings suggest that targeted government spending that benefits specific individuals may 
also sway affected voters, and conversely that voters will punish governments for policy 
reforms that adversely affect them. This suggests that there is pocketbook voting, but mainly 
when the name on the check is the government of the day.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
TABLE 1: Predicting transition probabilities of party support at t by financial change 
 
CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT (1991-1996) 
DV: Party support (at t)  Conservative Labour Liberals None 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Change in Finances:         
Worse off -0.11* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00   0.02 
Stayed the same 0.05* 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.05* 0.02 
Better off 0.05* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.04* 0.02 
LABOUR GOVERNMENT (1997-2008) 
DV: Party support (at t)  Conservative Labour Liberals None 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Change in Finances:         
Worse off 0.05* 0.01 -0.07* 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02* 0.01 
Stayed the same 0.00 0.01 0.05* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Better off -0.04* 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
 
Note: * p<0.05. The results are based on a Markov-chain model predicting the transition probability to change 
party support from one panel wave to the next. Additionally to the coefficients reported here, the model 
estimated coefficients 𝛽1𝑟𝑠𝑡 which capture the effects of being a supporter of a party r at t-1 on the probability of 
remaining loyal to that party or switching to party s. These coefficients are allowed to vary over time and are 
available upon request from the authors. Control variables measuring age-group, housing tenure, region, 
education, income, occupational social class and sector of work are included in the models at the first time point, 
but are not shown here (see Appendix 2). Other minor parties are included in the models, but not shown here 
(see Appendix 3). 
 
Data: BHPS 1991-2008. Number of respondents: 1991-1996 9,354; 1997-2008 17,183.  
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TABLE 2: Predicted proportion of people supporting the Conservatives and Labour given 
their previous financial circumstances and previous party support (including 
95 per cent confidence intervals in grey) 
 
  
CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT (1991-1996) 
  
Conservative support (at t)  
 
Labour support (at t) 
Financial change Worse off Better off Δ  
 
Worse off Better off Δ  
Party 
support 
(at t-1) 
Conservative 80.0% 83.3% -3.3%  4.6% 3.7% 0.9% 
 [79.4; 80.6] [82.7; 83.9]    [4.3; 4.8] [3.5; 3.9]  
Labour 1.8% 2.2% -0.4%  87.6% 86.5% 1.1% 
 [1.6;1.9] [2.0; 2.3]   [87.2; 88.0] [86.0; 87.0]  
Liberal  6.3% 7.1% -0.8% 
 
15.7% 15.4% 0.3% 
 
[5.8; 6.6] [6.6; 7.6] 
  
[15.0; 16.4] [14.7; 17.2] 
 
None  12.5% 14.5% -2.0% 
 
17.8% 16.6% 1.1% 
 
[11.8; 13.0] [13.8;15.1] 
  
[17.1; 18.5] [15.9; 17.4] 
 
 
 
LABOUR GOVERNMENT (1997-2008) 
  
Conservative support (at t) 
 
Labour support (at t) 
Financial change Worse off Better off Δ 
 
Worse off Better off Δ 
Party 
support 
(at t-1) 
Conservative 83.9% 82.0% 1.9%  2.9% 3.5% -0.6% 
 [83.3; 84.4] [81.4; 82.6]   [2.7; 3.1] [3.3; 3.7]  
Labour 2.8% 2.6% 0.3%  78.3% 79.2% -0.9% 
 [2.7; 3.0] [2.4; 2.7]   [77.8; 78.8] [78.8; 79.6]  
Liberal  6.5% 6.0% 0.5% 
 
9.1% 9.7% -0.6% 
 
[6.1; 6.9] [5.6; 6.4] 
  
[8.6; 9.6] [9.2; 10.2] 
 
None  9.6% 8.6% 0.9% 
 
11.9% 12.7% -0.8% 
 
[9.2; 10.0] [8.3; 9.0] 
  
[11.4; 12.3] [12.3; 13.1] 
 
 
Note: The estimates are based on the results presented in Table 1. Statistically significant differences at the 5 per 
cent level are highlighted in bold. 
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TABLE 3: Predicting transition probabilities of party support at t by reasons for financial 
change 
 
 
CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT (1991-1996) 
DV: Party support (at t) Conservatives Labour Liberals None 
 
coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. 
Change in Finances:             
Increased earnings 0.11*  0.05 -0.06  0.04 -0.14*  0.05 0.03  0.04 
Increased benefits 0.23*  0.12 0.06  0.11 0.06  0.12 -0.16  0.12 
Reduced expenses 0.02  0.09 -0.04  0.08 0.04  0.09 0.05  0.08 
Other increase 0.18*  0.07 -0.16*  0.07 -0.20*  0.08 -0.01  0.07 
Same/No change 0.09*  0.03 0.00  0.03 -0.06  0.03 0.09*  0.03 
Decreased earnings -0.18*  0.06 0.01  0.05 -0.02  0.06 0.09  0.05 
Decreased benefits -0.37*  0.15 0.12  0.12 0.23  0.14 -0.19  0.13 
More expenses -0.08  0.05 0.09*  0.04 0.04  0.05 0.08  0.05 
Other decrease -0.01  0.07 -0.02  0.06 0.07  0.07 0.02  0.06 
 
 
LABOUR GOVERNMENT (1997-2008) 
DV: Party support (at t) Conservatives Labour Liberals None 
 
coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. 
Change in Finances:             
Increased earnings -0.06*  0.03 -0.01  0.02 0.03  0.03 0.07*  0.02 
Increased benefits 0.06  0.06 0.35*  0.05 0.01  0.06 -0.22*  0.05 
Reduced expenses -0.05  0.05 0.00  0.04 0.07  0.05 0.04  0.03 
Other increase 0.03  0.04 -0.03  0.03 0.03  0.04 -0.03  0.03 
Same/No change 0.00  0.02 0.06*  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.01 
Decreased earnings -0.01  0.04 -0.02  0.03 0.02  0.04 0.04  0.03 
Decreased benefits -0.16  0.11 -0.13  0.08 -0.23*  0.11 0.22*  0.07 
More expenses 0.06*  0.03 -0.05*  0.02 0.04  0.03 -0.08*  0.02 
Other decrease 0.14*  0.04 -0.15*  0.04 0.02  0.05 -0.05  0.03 
 
Note: * p<0.05. The results are based on a Markov-Chain model predicting the transition probability to change 
party support from one panel wave to the next. Additionally to the coefficients reported here, the model 
estimated coefficients 𝛽1𝑟𝑠𝑡 which capture the effects of being a supporter of a party r at t-1 on the probability of 
remaining loyal to that party or switching to party s. These coefficients are allowed to vary over time and are 
available upon request from the authors. Control variables measuring age-group, housing tenure, region, 
education, income, occupational social class and sector of work are included in the models at the first time point, 
but are not shown here (see Appendix 2). Other minor parties are included in the models, but not shown here 
(see Appendix 3). 
 
Data: BHPS 1991-2008. Number of respondents: 1991-1996 9,354; 1997-2008 17,183.  
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FIGURE 1: Predicted proportion of people staying loyal to the governing party given their 
changing benefit levels (incl. 95% C.I.) 
 
      CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT (1991-1996) LABOUR GOVERNMENT (1997-2008) 
 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from Table 3. Bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
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FIGURE 2: Predicted proportion of people defecting to the governing party given their 
changing benefit levels and previous party support (incl. 95% C.I.) 
 
         CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT (1991-1996) LABOUR GOVERNMENT (1997-2008) 
 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from Table 3. Bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
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TABLE 4:  Model fit 
 
 
CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT (1991-1996) 
 
Log Likelihood LR df sig 
M0: Only control variables at t=0 -41,078 
   
M1: Incl. financial change (Table 1) -41,060 36 8 0.001 
M2: Incl. reasons for financial change (Table 2)  -41,037 82 16 0.001 
 
LABOUR GOVERNMENT (1997-2008) 
 
Log Likelihood LR df sig 
M0: Only control variables at t=0 -124,851 
   
M1: Incl. financial change (Table 1) -124,824 54 8 0.001 
M2: Incl. reasons for financial change (Table 2) -124,755 192 16 0.001 
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TABLE 5:  Fixed effects logit regression model predicting government party support 
versus opposition or no party support 
 
 
Conservative government 
support (1991-1996)  
Labour government 
support (1997-2008) 
 
coef. 
 
se 
 
coef. 
 
se 
Financial change (Ref: Got better) 
      
Worse off -0.24 *  0.06 
 
-0.17 *  0.03 
Same -0.13 *  0.06 
 
-0.12 *  0.03 
        
Control variables Age, income, sector, class, employment 
        
N of cases 2,358 
 
6,920 
N of average obs. 5.3 
 
8.5 
        
Financial change reasons (Ref: Same/no change) 
    
Increased earnings 0.12 
 
0.09 
 
0.10 *  0.03 
Increased benefits 0.32 
 
0.24 
 
0.28 *  0.08 
Reduced expenses -0.08 
 
0.15 
 
0.06 
 
0.06 
Other increase 0.07 
 
0.13 
 
0.11 *  0.05 
Decreased earnings -0.27 *  0.11 
 
0.03 
 
0.05 
Decreased benefits -0.53 
 
0.37 
 
-0.08 
 
0.12 
More expenses -0.27 *  0.10 
 
-0.08 *  0.04 
Other decrease -0.52 *  0.13 
 
-0.04 
 
0.06 
        
Control variables Age, income, sector, class, employment 
    
N of cases 1,897 
 
6,819 
N of average obs. 4.5 
 
8.4 
 
Note: * p<0.05. The dependent variable here measures support for the incumbent party versus any other party or 
no party. 
 
Data: BHPS 1991-2008.  
 
